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ABSTRACT

From August to November 1940, the territories of French Equatorial Africa
rallied to Charles de Gaulle’s self-proclaimed Free French government in London, rather
than the Vichy government set up after the German defeat of France in June. While this
episode concerns European actions in European-ruled colonies, African actors pervade
the story, especially as soldiers. Africans constituted the indirect audience of all the
rallies by living in the territories whose policies were affected. Africans served as actors
in the role of soldiers. As soldiers, African actors exhibited agency both in actions taken
during operations and by their presence in the colonial military. African audiences also
demonstrated agency in their responses to actions in the rallies and circumstances around
them, though their exclusion from many public forums limited the extent to which they
could influence policy or document their efforts. Though Africans did not direct the
rallies in AEF, they significantly influenced the outcomes within the constraints set up by
the colonial system.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

On August 26, 1940, French Guyana-born Félix Éboué stood alongside the
military commander of the French colony of Chad as the commander announced that
Chad would align itself with Charles de Gaulle’s self-proclaimed French government in
London, rather than the French government under Marshal Pétain set up at Vichy after
the German defeat of France in May-June 1940. At 2 AM the next morning in
neighboring French-ruled Cameroon, two envoys from Charles de Gaulle landed along
with less than thirty Frenchmen in canoes on the docks of Douala. With a few key allies
in the port city, he seized control of the city and proclaimed himself in control of the
entire colony, which he announced would henceforth be aligned with de Gaulle. On
August 28, 1940, another Gaullist envoy crossed from Léopoldville (now Kinshasa) in
the Belgian Congo to Brazzaville in French Moyen-Congo, announcing that he too would
take power in the name of de Gaulle after an armed insurrection ousted the pro-Vichy
governor. The next day in inland Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic), the
governor announced his territory would also align with Charles de Gaulle, prompting a
brief battle for control of the territorial capital with a pro-Vichy army officer. The one
remaining territory in this federation of French Equatorial Africa (AEF), Gabon,
announced its alignment with de Gaulle on the 30th, only to retract it the next day. Only
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after a prolonged military campaign from its neighboring colonies would Gabon also
align itself with Charles de Gaulle. 1
Publics outside France and Central Africa have rarely heard of this early chapter
in the Second World War, and it has generated almost no historical scholarship in
English. Even within French literature and the limited English-language historiography,
more has been written analyzing the rule of Pétain’s Vichy government in French West
Africa (AOF)2 and other theaters,3 with little attention paid to the territories of AEF. 4

1

For broad accounts of these events in widely available published sources see: Edgard de Larminat,
Chroniques irrévérencieuses (Paris: Plon, 1962), 134-161; Brian Weinstein, Éboué (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1972), 230-251; and Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France Libre. De l’appel du 18
juin à la Libération volume 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 140-150. Online accounts are also available through
the Fondation de la France Libre website: For Brazzaville, see M.J. Rochette, “La « maison des
conspirateurs » ou les dessous du coup d'État de Brazzaville,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no.
75 (February 1955), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/maisonconspirateurs.php (accessed April 3, 2012). For Cameroon, see Général Roger Gardet, “Le ralliement du
Cameroun à la France Libre (27 août 1940),” extract from Revue de la France Libre no. 207 (aoûtseptembre-octobre 1974), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignagesdocuments/temoignages/ralliement-cameroun-fl.php (accessed April 3, 2012); Médécin-général inspecteur
Guy Chauliac, “L’AEF et le Cameroun se rallient,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no. 288 (4e
trimester, 1994), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/aefcameroun.php (accessed April 3, 2012); for Chad, “Le Tchad et le Congo,” extract from Revue de la
France Libre, no. 156 bis (June 1965), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignagesdocuments/temoignages/tchad-et-congo.php (accessed April 8, 2012).
2
One might characterize this phenomenon as a Vichy Syndrome in reverse: fixation on the Vichy Empire,
with little critical attention to the Gaullist Empire. The reasons for this, perhaps rooted in the conflation of
the wartime Gaullist narrative of resurrection with De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic presidency of
decolonization, need further exploration. On Vichy’s role in administering AOF, see: Ruth Ginio, “Marshal
Petain Spoke to Schoolchildren: Vichy Propaganda in French West Africa, 1940-1943,” The International
Journal of African Historical Studies 33:2 (2000): 291-312; William I. Hitchcock, “Pierre Boisson, French
West Africa, and the Postwar Epuration: A Case from the Aix Files,” French Historical Studies 24:2
(Spring 2001): 305-341; Ruth Ginio, “Vichy Rule in French West Africa: Prelude to Decolonization?”
French Colonial History 4 (2003): 205-226; and Harry Gamble, “The National Revolution in French West
Africa: Dakar-Jeunes and the shaping of African opinion,” International Journal of Francophone Studies
10:1+2 (2007): 85-103. For a territorial focus across the Vichy and Gaullist periods, see for example JeanNoël Loucou, “La Deuxième guerre mondiale et ses effets en Côte-d’Ivoire,” Annales de l’Université
d’Abidjan 8 (1980): 181-207. On AOF’s involvement with Gaullism, see: Denise Bouche, “Le retour de
l’Afrique Occidentale Française dans la lutte contre l’ennemi aux côtés des Alliés,” Revue d’histoire de la
Deuxième guerre mondiale no. 114 (1979): 41-68; Nancy Lawler, “Reform and Repression under the Free
French: Economic and Political Transformation in the Côte d’Ivoire, 1942-45,” Africa: Journal of the
International African Institute 60:1 (1990): 88-110; Nancy Lawler, “The Crossing of the Gyaman to the
Cross of Lorraine: Wartime Policies in West Africa, 1941-1942,” African Affairs 96:382 (January 1997):
53-71; Ruth Ginio, “French Colonial Reading of Ethnographic Research: The Case of the ‘Desertion’ of the
Abron King and its Aftermath,” Cahiers d’Études Africaines 42:166 (2002): 337-357.
3
On Vichy’s imperial policies generally, see: Eric Jennings, Vichy in the Tropics: The National Revolution
in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
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At face value, the preceding narrative appears as a European story told in the
context of a European war, only by happenstance taking place on African soil. While it is
a story about Europeans’ actions in European-ruled colonies, African actors pervade the
story, especially as soldiers. 5 Therefore, this study will examine these events6 from an
African perspective. Without an African perspective on August-November 1940, we lose
the voices of the majority of those involved and impacted, French society retains a false
image of European officers operating in a vacuum, and African postcolonial societies fail
to capture the critical role Africans played in determining their territories’ alignment in
the Second World War.
Even though the traditional French narrative of national resurrection prefers to
root itself in the bravado and will to power from a set of supermen headed by Charles de
Gaulle, the oft-ignored Africans’ voices deserve hearing as integral parts of the history of
the Second World War. One European colonist in Cameroon tried to discourage his
African interpreter from involving himself in the controversy, saying that “you stay here.
It’s not the same for you.”7 By asking such men to die for the cause of France, though,

2002), especially chapter 1, “Vichy’s Colonial Empire in 1940: A New Colonial Vision,” pp. 9-31; Jacques
Cantier and Eric Jennings, eds., L’Empire Colonial sous Vichy (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2004); and Hubert
Bonin, Christophe Bouneau, et Hervé Joly, eds., Les entreprises et l’outre-mer français pendant la Seconde
Guerre mondiale (Pessac: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme d’Aquitaine, 2010).
4
Bernard Lanne claims that the history of July-August 1940 alone demand a book to themselves. Bernard
Lanne, “Le Tchad pendant la guerre (1939-1945),” in Charles Robert Ageron, ed., Les Chemins de la
décolonisation de l’Empire colonial français (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1986), 441.
5
Some very good scholarship (again, mostly in French), has been done concerning Africans in the First
World War, most notably by Marc Michel. Work on African involvement in the Second World War has
tended to focus on Africans serving in Europe, notably: Myron Echenberg, “‘Morts Pour La France’: The
African Soldier in France During the Second World War,” The Journal of African History 26:4 (1985):
363-380; and on African POWs, Armelle Mabon, Prisonniers de guerre « indigènes »: Visages oubliés de
la France occupé (Paris: La Découverte, 2010).
6
Known as the Trois Glorieuses (Three Glorious Days) of August 26-28, 1940, and the military conquest
of Gabon.
7
Jacques Kuoh Moukouri, Doigts noirs : « Je fus Écrivain-Interprète au Cameroun » (Montréal: Les
éditions à la page, 1963), 80.
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the pro-Charles de Gaulle Free French, or Gaullists, 8 made Africans a part of that story.
The Gaullist Guy Chauliac recognized this in writing that “AEF recommenced the fight
with African soldiers, two months after the [French] defeat,” thereby earning the right “to
leave its name in the history of France.” 9
This study stems from European archival materials rather than African sources,
representing a key limitation. However, the preliminary conclusions culled only from
European records make the case for further research in Africa, and set an agenda for that
research, including examination of local press and retrieval of oral histories. As Jérôme
Ollandet noted, previous historical works have “only presented one version of events, that
of the colonizer,” and “the portion of history of this era that remains unwritten is that of
the natives.” Where his work has begun to fill that gap in French, this paper hopes to
continue in English. 10
Two kinds of rallies occurred in AEF. In Chad and Oubangui-Chari, governors
already in place effected what may be dubbed ‘bureaucratic’ rallies, simply reorienting
their colony’s policy toward de Gaulle. In Cameroon, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon,
external actors took power by force, ousting pro-Vichy governors and replacing them
with Gaullist governments, in what might be called ‘military’ rallies, since soldiers
intervened to topple the pro-Vichy governments. The rallies involved two kinds of
people: actors whose actions affected the rallies, and audiences with whom the
participants came into contact. This study identifies audiences as important because
8

The terms Gaullist and Free French, in opposition to Vichy French, are contemporary terms, and will be
used interchangeably throughout this study.
9
Médécin-général inspecteur Guy Chauliac, “L’AEF et le Cameroun se rallient,” extract from Revue de la
France Libre, no. 288 (4e trimester, 1994), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignagesdocuments/temoignages/aef-cameroun.php (accessed April 3, 2012).
10
Jérôme Ollandet, Brazzaville capitale de la France Libre : Histoire de la résistance française en Afrique
(1940-1944) (Brazzaville : Éditions de la Savane, n.d.), 9.
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observers’ and bystanders’ reactions demonstrated whether they accepted the legitimacy
of the rallies and offers clues into the way they made sense of the confusing conflicts
going on around them.
Africans constituted the indirect audience of all the rallies by living in the
territories whose policies were affected. Africans participated as soldiers in the rallies of
Moyen-Congo, Oubangui-Chari, and Gabon. As soldiers, African actors exhibited
agency both in actions taken during operations and by their presence in the colonial
military. African audiences also demonstrated agency in their responses to actions in the
rallies and circumstances around them, though their exclusion from many public forums
limited the extent to which they could influence policy or document their efforts. Though
Africans did not direct the rallies in AEF, they significantly influenced the outcomes of
the rallies as participants in the rallies and as audiences of the rallies.

5

CHAPTER TWO

AFRICAN ACTORS IN THE RALLIES
Africans did not begin efforts to rally the colonies of AEF to Charles de Gaulle’s
Free France. Henri Laurentie, the aide to Félix Éboué who helped orchestrate the rally of
Chad, attested that the Free French rally movements were in fact executed “outside of the
native population”11 and the rallies were “conceived and led by the Europeans.” 12 This
truth does not preclude all African agency, since the colonial power structures European
Gaullists operated in excluded Africans. Indeed, a recent study of the Free French
movement noted the difficulty inherent in discussing the motivations of African soldiers,
since their de facto rallies under their commanding officers rested “in the logic of the
colonial system,” that “the behavior of European officers dictated that of the majority of
the colonial soldiers under their authority.” 13 Studying African soldiers particularly, Éric
Deroo and Antoine Champeaux claim that African soldiers obeyed their military
commanders and “followed them and joined the Gaullists.”14 This study argues that in the
very act of not making a choice, by simply following their officers, Africans determined
their own behavior, albeit constrained by the colonial system.
11

“Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE Délégué adjoint de la France à la commission
du “Trusteeship” témoignage recueilli par Melle GOUINEAU, le 19 octobre 1948 à Versailles (O.N.U.)” p.
16. Found in Archives Nationales de la France [hereafter AN] AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2.
12
Henri Laurentie, “L’Empire au secours de la Métropole,” p. 15. Found in archives at the Mémorial de
Caen [hereafter Caen] Caen FL 70(2).
13
Sébastien Albertelli, Atlas de la France Libre : De Gaulle et la France Libre, une aventure politique
(Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2010), 14.
14
Éric Deroo et Antoine Champeaux, La Force Noire : Gloire et infortunes d’une légende coloniale (Paris:
Tallandier, 2006), 185.

6

In the bureaucratic rally of Chad, for example, the choice to rally to de Gaulle was
made by French colonial officials, a stratum that excluded Africans. Europeans, and the
European-educated appointee Éboué, not Africans, initiated contacts with General de
Gaulle in London to arrange for a Gaullist alignment, since Africans could not have made
official contacts with British Nigerian officials. 15 Europeans, not Africans, participated in
the often contentious debates over whether or not to comply with the Vichy government’s
armistices with Germany and Italy, because no one concerned themselves with the
African population’s opinion. 16 The small ‘war council’ that met in Fort-Lamy on August
26 to confirm Chad’s rally to de Gaulle consisted of Europeans, excepting the Guyanese
Éboué, but certainly not Africans, whose opinions were neither sought nor consulted. 17
This account of African non-action in Chad’s rally tells less about African opinion than
about the exclusion of African opinion from political policymaking during the colonial
era, so Africans cannot be condemned as inactive in the movement given they were not
consulted or empowered to make their voices heard.
Though Africans were excluded from political and military policymaking, they
were intimately involved in policy implementation, since Europeans valued Africans as
soldiers to execute their decisions even though they did not value them as active citizens

15

Laurentie, “L’Empire au secours de la Métropole,” 10-11. Caen FL 70(2).
For example, European residents of Fort-Lamy shouted down Boisson, en route to Dakar to be appointed
‘High Commissioner for French Black Africa,’ as a “bastard” and “traitor” on July 20, 1940. Cf.
“Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 6. AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. That those involved
in this incident were Europeans is specified in Félix Éboué, “Note sur la situation Politique et Militaire du
Tchad,” (July 27, 1940), appended in telegram from Éboué to de Gaulle, 3. AN 72AJ/538/2/2 (Le Tchad,
Divers Notes – Correspondences). Similarly, a European officer, Moitessier, did not engage the African
soldiery but rather the European officers when he accosted them in early August, asking “what the hell are
you doing here, if you’re Gaullists?,” “Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 7. AN
72AJ/225/1/pièce 2.
17
“Témoignage de Monsieur le Gouverneur LAURENTIE,” 8. AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 2. Jonathan Derrick,
“Free French and Africans in Douala, 1940-41,” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 10:2 (June
1980), 61-62 makes similar observations about the non-consultation of anti-German Cameroonians by the
Free French operatives at Douala.
16
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making valuable contributions to policymaking. As Pierre Messmer cogently
summarized, throughout the rallies “no one asked the Africans because no one thought of
them.”18 Thus, Africans could not serve as actors in the bureaucratic rallies where nonAfrican policymakers affected the rally, but could serve as soldiers in the military rallies.
Africans had penetrated the colonial institution of the military voluntarily and by
conscription: African recruits comprised the majority of the soldiers stationed in AEF in
1940. These soldiers, only about 30,000 for all of sub-Saharan Africa, constituted mere
“sovereignty forces” to serve as enforcers of “political order and charged with assuring
the security of the territory.” 19 With such a tiny aggregate population, the participation of
even small numbers of soldiers could prove decisive in physically securing important
administrative posts.
Small glimpses of Africans taking direct action to mobilize their fellow soldiers
for the Gaullist cause come from Oubangui-Chari. In Oubangui-Chari on July 21, a
handful of African soldiers joined French reservists in the Bangui garrison in seizing
arms from a depot around 6 PM and fleeing toward Cameroon in hopes of reaching
Nigeria and supporting the British war effort.20 On August 29, when interim governor de
Saint-Mart announced to Oubangui-Chari’s pro-Vichy military commandant that he
would follow Brazzaville in rallying to de Gaulle, “the native troops of the Bangui
garrison…had passed over to de Gaulle’s side” due to the influence of two African men,
Georges Koudoukou (known as “the father of the riflemen” for his long service and
fatherly role among his colleagues), and Sarah Mouniro (who came from a chieftaincy
18

Pierre Messmer, Les Blancs s’en vont: Récits de décolonisation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1998), 16.
Eugène-Jean Duval, L’épopée des tirailleurs sénégalaises (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), 239.
20
Pierre Kalck, Histoire de la République Centrafricaine: des origines préhistoriques à nos jours (Paris:
Berger-Levrault, 1974), 260. More details on this extraordinary event would likely be available in local
Bangui press.
19
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family). 21 More research, particularly in Central African Republic, needs to be done in
order to flesh out the implications of these fascinating instances of African
insubordination at a critical juncture.
Most participation by Africans came as soldiers followed the orders of their
officers, either executing coups against existing governments for Gaullist officers or
defending those governments for pro-Vichy officers. Thus, in Moyen-Congo, soldiers’
cooperation with their Gaullist officers’ insurrectionism proved critical on August 28,
with soldiers opting for compliance with their officers. African troops’ effective
compliance with their officers facilitated the conquest of Gabon, but notable examples of
non-compliance with pro-Vichy European officers provide valuable insight into African
agency during the rallies. Africans’ presence in the colonial military demonstrated a
limited degree of agency, as did their choices to obey their officers whether they aligned
themselves with de Gaulle or Vichy.

Compliance in Brazzaville
In Brazzaville, the Gaullist conspirators had seen the African soldiers as the key
to the operation’s success, particularly due to their Sara ethnicity. The French military
commanders considered the south Chadian Saras passive civilians but ferocious warriors,
an ideal combination for colonial military leaders. As a more recent study of the complex
Franco-Sara relationship recounts, “French administrators never abandoned their

21

Jean-Christophe Notin, 1061 Compagnons: Histoire des Compagnons de la Libération (Paris: Perrin,
2000), 170.

9

preference for this southern ethnic group.”22 Known as ‘the beautiful race’ (la belle race)
for “their proverbial physical fitness,” the French favored the Sara as conscripts because
they were seen as “docile and passive...useful particularly as a reservoir of manpower.” 23
One eyewitness even traced the stable rally of Chad to the extreme discipline of the
Chadian Sara.24 Contained within the passive colonial, though, the French mobilized and
mythologized the martial spirit of the Sara, with one recruiter reminiscing on these
“magnificent types, nearly giants.”25 During the Gabon campaign, French commanders
felt the need to restrain their Sara soldiers, since “if the Sarra [sic] Tirailleurs were once
let loose in a major combat it might be difficult to restrain them.” 26 Fellow Africans also
identified a particular ferocity and arrogance in the Sara, with rumors spreading that
“they had made common cause with the French in their war against the Germans, and in
the course of this war they had deployed their talents as devastators of countries and
rapists of women.”27 These common French and African observations lead us to see a
deeper cultural affinity toward participation in the rallies among Sara troops. Such
affinities do not preclude individual soldiers’ ability to make choices, but certainly
strongly shape the context in which Sara soldiers would choose to cooperate with French

22

Mario Azevedo, “The Human Price of Development: The Brazzaville Railroad and the Sara of Chad,”
African Studies Review 24:1 (March 1981), 1. Azevedo, 8-9 demonstrate French attachment of importance
to their opinion during the Congo-Océan construction.
23
René Lemarchand, “The Politics of Sara Ethnicity: A Note on the Origins of the Civil War in Chad,”
Cahiers d’Études Africaines 20 (1980), 453.
24
Colonel Jacques Florentin, “Les confins sahariens du Tchad et le colonel Leclerc,” in Le Général Leclerc
et l’Afrique Française Libre 1940-1942 Actes du Colloque International 12, 13, et 14 novembre 1987
(Paris: Fondation Maréchal Leclerc de Hauteclocque, 1988), 415.
25
Joseph Kessel, quoted in André Casalis, “Adrien Conus,” extract from Revue de la France Libre, no. 310
(4e trimestre 2000), available at http://www.france-libre.net/temoignages-documents/temoignages/adrienconus.php (accessed April 3, 2012).
26
Entry for October 15 [1940], War Diary, French Equatorial Africa, 20 Military Mission, October 1940.
Found in United Kingdom National Archives [hereafter UK], WO 178/4, “Military Mission Brazzaville,
1940 Oct-Dec.”
27
Henri-Richard Manga Mado, Complaintes d’un forçat (Yaoundé: Éditions CLE, 1970), 48.
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officers and engage in martial activity. Rather than dismissing agency, these ethnographic
observations inform how certain Africans might have made their choices.
Gaullist authors often specify the ethnicity of the Sara soldiers under Major
Raymond Delange, stranded in Brazzaville en route for France when the armistice
intervened, whereas Gaullist writers rarely specify ethnicity elsewhere. Thus, General de
Larminat’s memoirs identified the Chadian battalion as “constituted of the best Sara
soldiers.”28 Notin also took note of the Chadian troops’ Sara ethnicity, calling them
“ardent warriors.”29 Lieutenant Muracciole, writing in 1948, claimed a kind of inherent
loyalty to the French officers, claiming “Delange could count on his detachment of Sara
soldiers.”30 Husson also recognized the strength these crack forces gave to Delange, and
thus attempted to disperse the battalion on August 27 to preclude any plot by Delange. 31
Beyond the European’s ethnic assumptions, a geographical loyalty appears to have been
at work, since a Gaullist officer deployed to mobilize his Sara troops to seize the
Governor-General’s palace found that they complied readily on hearing of their native
Chad’s rally. 32
Beyond mere Sara determinism, Africans of several ethnicities executed the
operation to topple Husson. Africans also defended Husson, since Sicé points out that
“riflemen [typically referring to African conscripts, known colloquially as tirailleurs, or
riflemen] patrolled in the city and others kept guard at intersections” in order to inhibit

28

Larminat, 148.
Notin, 167.
30
Lieutenant J. Muracciole, “La Conquête de la Base Africaine,” in Louis Mouilleseaux, ed., La France et
son Empire dans la Guerre, v. 1 (Paris: Éditions Littéraires de France, 1947), 90.
31
A. Sicé, L’Afrique Équatoriale Française et le Cameroun au Service de la France (26-27-28 août 1940)
(Paris: Presses Univérsitaires de la France, 1946), 153.
32
Muracciole, “La Conquête de la Base Africaine,” 90.
29
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any clandestine uprising.33 Delange made effective use of his African soldiers, however,
dispatching at least one African corporal to seize the munitions store in Brazzaville on the
28th; the corporal happened to be Jean-Bedel Bokassa, later President (and erstwhile
emperor) of the Central African Republic. 34 After seizing the munitions, Delange and his
European subordinates distributed arms to the non-dispersed Sara troops and seized
control of the military camp outside Brazzaville. Likewise, one of Delange’s lieutenants
led a group of Sara riflemen to attack positions around the Governor-General’s office,
making the military operation forcing General Husson’s surrender an African execution,
albeit under European command. 35
African soldiers actively participated in the rally of Brazzaville by obeying their
Gaullist officers even as those officers’ orders turned Africans’ guns against other
Europeans. Europeans traced this compliance to the soldiers’ Sara ethnicity, a claim
which would necessitate greater research in Chad and the former AEF territories through
oral histories and family memory to trace back the motivations of the participating
soldiers.

Non-compliance in the Gabon Campaign
The Gabon conflict, sometimes characterized as a Franco-French conflict to
highlight the fratricidal nature of the conflict between the Gaullists and pro-Vichy forces,
also entailed an Afro-African conflict, as African soldiers under the command of both
sides battled one another under the orders of their competing officers. Cameroonian and
33

Muracciole, “La Conquête de la Base Africaine,” 90.
Stanislas Mangin, “Histoire : L’action de force de Delange à Brazzaville en août 1940,” Le Monde 2324/5/76: 9. AN 72AJ/225/1/pièce 9b.
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Congolese soldiers fought and won the conquest of Gabon, since these formed “the core
recruits of the first battalions” constituted by the new Gaullist administrations in those
colonies to complete the rally of AEF. 36 African compliance had progressive results in at
least one case, since Africans participated in the highly skilled tasks of the air force,
usually reserved for Europeans, during the Libreville operation, in addition to their
participation as part of the Gaullist military forces. 37
More interestingly, however, certain instances of non-compliance by soldiers in
the Gabon campaign provide insight into the agency retained by African soldiers even
under European command.
Throughout the Gabonese campaign, pro-Vichy French officers abandoned
colonial towns, leaving African soldiers without commanders. These African soldiers
usually remained and rallied to the Gaullist forces. Thus, after the bombing of Mitzic by
Gaullist planes, British observers noted that the European officers and colonists
abandoned the town, fleeing toward Libreville or Spanish Guinea (now Equatorial
Guinea), while “native troops…[started] to rally at Mitzig [sic].” 38 The Mitzic example of
African soldiers failing to follow their officers attests to a African soldiers’ agency to
adjust to the evolving military situation. Thus, the soldiers in Mitzic opted not to resist
the oncoming Gaullist forces, perhaps influenced by the exercise of air power against
Mitzic. Even in opting not to act, though, the African soldiers demonstrated agency by
making a choice, and their choices proved demonstrably different from the choices made
36
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by their European officers. The Mitzic operation reflects African agency to resist the
Gaullists as well, though, since sixty partisans attacked the “convoys from the back,”
injuring two officers and delaying the advance into Mitzic. 39
The Gaullist siege of Lambaréné repeated the pattern established at Mitzic.
African troops fought on both sides of the conflict, as “four native companies from
Brazzaville” laid siege to Lambaréné, while “around eight companies of natives”
defended the town.40 As at Mitzic, once the Gaullist attack began in earnest, “the officers
abandoned their troops.”41 Gaullist accounts claim that this abandonment was the cause
of the subsequent pillage of the city before the Gaullist forces occupied the city. Adolphe
Sicé, surgeon general at Brazzaville, directly connects the two events, claiming the
officers’ flight left “the administrative post to be pillaged.” 42 Raymond Waag, a bitter
pro-Vichy prisoner writing from an anti-Gaullist perspective, reverses the attribution,
claiming “the Gaullists” sacked “all the stores of the town,” a pillage in which “the
Europeans participated, along with their [African soldiers].” He seems to write with
disgust of how “diverse merchandise was taken, to be sold, to the natives, by the [African
soldiers],” and claims one Gaullist officer even approved Africans raiding a wine cellar,
saying “they are doing well.” 43 British observers fail to mention any pillage, however,
noting that “native troops [were] wandering around Lambaréné without arms.” 44
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Whatever may have happened at Lambaréné after the European officers abandoned it,
Africans made conscious decisions not to follow their European officers in flight,
preferring to remain in the city either to enjoy rare freedom of movement or to capitalize
on the chaotic situation to gain material benefit.
One of the most interesting incidents uncovered in French archives comes from
Booué, a town along the Ogooué River, captured by the Gaullists on October 23, 1940.
The Gaullist account claims that in Booué on October 22, the pro-Vichy administrator
Goedert dispatched three Africans (Mombo Kombila, Marcel M’Fain, and Emmanuel
Ango) to notify a nearby post about Gaullist forces and movements. Upon arriving in
Booué, the Gaullist commander noted the absence of the three Africans and dispatched
three other African soldiers (Goma, Youdengué, and Lebissa) to retrieve them. Goedert,
however, claimed that one of the Africans, Mombo Kombila, had fled the outpost of his
own accord.45
The oral transcripts appended to the Gaullist commander’s report on the incident
give a glimpse into the relations between and among Africans and Europeans in wartime
Gabon. The Kombila case will be considered first, with the largely separate M’Fain case
considered second.
Kombila claims he visited Goedert’s office the night of October 22, having been
summoned by Emmanuel Ango, a detainee being used as a writer for Goedert’s office, on
Goedert’s behalf. At Goedert’s office, Goedert ordered him “to walk to Touka [a post
downriver from Booué] tonight,” paying attention “to not have yourself arrested by the
guards that the new whites have brought here.” “If the guards from Libreville are not at
45
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Touka” he should continue all the way to N’Djolé, a larger post farther downriver, in
order to “leave [a letter, written in Alsatian] with Monsieur Hommel.” He encountered no
soldiers of any kind throughout his nighttime march to Touka, and arriving there around
10 AM on October 23, discovered that the soldiers stationed there had only gone as far as
Boleko, between N’Djolé and Touka, but then turned around to return to N’Djolé.
Despite Goedert’s orders to take his messages as far as N’Djolé, Kombila “decided to
return to Booué,” and during the course of his return he was hailed by the three Gaullistdispatched searchers, with whom he returned voluntarily to Booué.46 Thus, Kombila
deliberately chose not to go as far as N’Djolé, perhaps reflecting an apathy about the need
to fight and die for a certain segment of the French colonists against another segment of
the French colonists. Kombila’s story is corroborated by the testimony of Staff Sergeant
Goma, a fellow Bapounou (or Punu), who certified that Kombila “made no difficulty in
coming to Booué with the two guards and myself.” 47 Another guard who helped Goma in
tracking Kombila offers a nuance to Kombila’s story, however, adding that he started his
return to Booué because he “had not wanted to go any farther and push toward
N’Djolé.”48 As Goma’s other companion, Youdengué, put it, Kombila simply “preferred”
to forego a long trip to N’Djolé.49
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Separate from the case of Kombila, the M’Fain case further demonstrates how
Africans could navigate the seemingly regimented world of the colonial military to serve
their own interests and meet their own needs. Marcel M’Fain claims that he was
dispatched, as he had been several times before, by Monsieur Fontaine, chief
administrator of the Djouah département, to retrieve deserters. Returning to Booué by
way of his home village (where he visited his wife), he met a messenger who instructed
him not to return to Booué. Despite this order, M’Fain continued, arriving the next day in
Gbanda. In Gbanda, he claims that he met Emmanuel Ango, “a prisoner who served as
writer for the major’s office.” M’Fain claims that Ango gave him a letter from Goedert to
deliver to the sergeant commanding the reinforcement force en route from N’Djolé to
Booué. M’Fain also claims that Ango specified that he was instructed to travel by night to
avoid being seen “by the guards that the new whites led from Moyen-Congo.” M’Fain
claims he accompanied Ango as far as Booué, but was sure to avoid detection by the
post’s guards. Then, after darkness fell, M’Fain began working his way back toward
N’Djolé, avoiding the main road to avoid being sighted by Gaullist troops, but en route
heard news that the reinforcement column had turned back to N’Djolé, allowing the
occupation of Booué “by the Sara from Moyen-Congo” to stand unchallenged.50
Another soldier, a Sara named Nouba, was dispatched on October 22 to compel
M’Fain to return after word came to Booué that he had stopped returning to Booué and
changed course to go to N’Djolé. Nouba caught up with M’Fain around 6:30 PM on
October 23 in a village along the route to N’Djolé, and M’Fain returned to Booué without
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protesting.51 M’Fain admitted in interrogation to carrying a letter in Alsatian addressed to
“M. Hummel” at N’Djolé.52
Ango claims that on October 22 around 5 PM, he went to Goedert’s home, where
his boss had been home sick, to report on the day’s events. He claims that Goedert,
relaying orders from the chief of the département Fontaine, sent him to tell all the
recently departed regional messengers not to return to Booué. He claims that Goedert
gave him two lists, 50 francs, and ordered him to retrieve Mombo Kombila, which he did.
He claims that he entered with Kombila, witnessing Goedert give him a letter to deliver
to the commander of the reinforcements coming to Booué from N’Djolé. After being
pressed by the interrogator, Ango admits that around noon that day, he had gone to a
village only five kilometers from Booué, where he found M’Fain with his wife, and
delivered another letter from Goedert, to be taken to the reinforcements en route also. 53
In terms of the triangular relationship of Ango-M’Fain-Goedert, all of the
competing claims do not entirely line up. For instance, M’Fain claims that he met Ango
at a village (Gbanda) two days after meeting his wife at another village (Mangaba), seven
hours’ walk from Booué.54 However, Ango claims that he met M’Fain in a village only
five kilometers from Booué (Ebaganda), where M’Fain was with his wife, and he makes
no mention of M’Fain accompanying him back to Booué.55 Moreover, Ango’s presence
in Booué the evening of October 22 is confirmed by the testimony of Kombila, who
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corroborates that he was summoned by Ango to Goedert’s house, although Kombila
claims that the administrator Fontaine, as well as a French doctor, was present with M.
Goedert,56 while Ango claims that they entered to find Goedert alone. 57 The M’FainAngo stories compare even more ambiguously when one considers that M’Fain claims to
have heard the order not to return to Booué from a different messenger in his wife’s
village of Mangaba,58 while Ango claims to have communicated this message to a variety
of messengers in the near vicinity of Booué.59
What actually happened from October 22-23 in Booué and in the villages between
Booué and N’Djolé seems less important than the fact that M’Fain and Ango crafted
particular versions of the events in order to provide space for their own activities: M’Fain
to visit his wife, and Ango to account for fifty francs he claims were given him by an
ailing Goedert, but which are mentioned nowhere else in accounts of the events and of
which even Ango does not provide the alleged purpose. Especially given his status as a
prisoner, he commands less credibility than Kombila, who appeared to have cooperated
with the relevant authorities at each step of the way. Even Kombila shows himself not
terribly concerned with executing his orders exactly, preferring not to continue all the
way to N’Djolé but to return to Booué on his own initiative and against the orders of
Goedert (corroborated by Ango’s account of the conversation between Goedert and
Ango60). Each of these Africans, even or especially amid the uncertainty of fratricidal
Franco-French conflict, find space within which to retain some freedom and flexibility.
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These Africans obeyed orders selectively: Kombila opting not to continue to N’Djolé and
M’Fain opting to continue toward Booué despite claiming he was ordered otherwise.
The African perspectives communicated in these depositions give some small
clues into how the African soldiers involved conceived of the contemporary conflict.
Both M’Fain and Kombila claim that Ango and Goedert, respectively, referred to the
Gaullist invaders as ‘the guards’ brought in by the “new whites.” The racialized (white)
rather than nationalized or politicized (French or Gaullist, respectively) term applied to
the opponent may reflect that Africans viewed their colonial dominators less as French,
German, pro-Vichy or pro-de Gaulle, and more as previous and current rulers. Thus, the
invaders are referred to as “new whites,” with their African military forces seen as
“brought” or “led” into Gabon.61 M’Fain even assigns an ethnic specificity to these
troops, describing Booué as occupied by the Sara specifically, though the fact that he was
retrieved by Nouba, identified as a Sara, might have contributed to this characterization. 62
The substantial documentary evidence for this militarily minor, if not
insignificant, incident reveals that behind the larger military movements within Gabon,
Africans operated on their own agendas within the fluid situation, negotiating a new
position for themselves in the wake of the Gaullist takeover. For instance, Kombila felt
the need to justify his own choices in his deposition to the Gaullist lieutenant, thus
assuming that he had agency in the situation. He uses the argument that he obeyed the
superior at hand, since “Monsieur Goedert being my direct superior, I had no reason not
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to obey him and so I departed immediately.” 63 M’Fain also felt the need to defend
himself, unprompted, by claiming that he “did not know what that letter contained,” when
presented with the Alsatian letter found on his person by Nouba. 64
These Africans assumed their own agency within the contemporary situation to
the extent that they felt the need to defend the rationale behind their actions, or preempt
accusations of cooperation with the pro-Vichy administrators. Since such factors were
present in such a minor case, historians should explore the possibility of other stories of
African agency, at least during the military operations in Gabon. Further examples may
not have the same official documentation, but oral and local historians in Gabon may be
able to discover other examples of African activity outside European control during this
period. The chaos of wartime may have been liberating to these African soldiers,
providing a window of opportunity to follow their own paths, even if just for an evening
or two, beyond the regimentation of European colonial control.

The Background of Compliance
Even when, as in Brazzaville and in much of the Gabon campaign, African
soldiers simply followed orders, we can look more generally at the reasons why Africans
would become soldiers for a European army to trace the agency of Africans. This
examination reveals both constraints on African agency, in the form of colonial
compulsion into military service, and non-coercive influences on African agency, in the
form of real social benefits motivating Africans to accept rather than rebel against
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systemic coercion. In 2009, Jean-François Muracciole summed up this duality well when
calling African soldiers “authentic Free French but false volunteers.” 65
The French system of volunteer soldiers in fact rested on coercion farmed out to
the French-appointed chiefs. Recruitment only rested “in theory on voluntary
engagement.”66 Bernard Lanne, discussing voluntarism in Chad, conflates how Sara
“were generally volunteers” with the fact that “constraint had to be used – exercised by
notables and chiefs.”67 Each French-appointed African chief was accountable for a quota
of soldiers (like any other raw material to be exploited out of Africa), leading many
chiefs to designate certain men for recruitment to appease the pressure from the colonial
officials, who would also pressure Africans in their villages to enlist, “without having the
time to say goodbye to [their] parents.”68 European officials were able to guarantee, with
certainty, that pressuring the African elite would stimulate the resumption of recruitment
so that “the requested number of recruits will be attained.” 69 One French colonist
depicted this process in a more benign form, telling how marching through Cameroon his
forces would wait at important towns for “more or less voluntary candidates” selected
following “the decision of their village chief.” 70
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Recruiters created terror, such that “scenes of panic were frequent in the villages,
fleers entering the brush and veritable manhunts organized in order to conscript them.” 71
One Brazzaville resident claims that “during the War, Brazzaville was completely
dominated by fear,” “the sight of [soldiers] sent people scurrying into the bush,” and
“men sought medicines that might protect them against recruitment” due to the “forced
enlistment of soldiers.” 72 One Cameroonian author uses language evocative of the
European slave trade, describing how “broad-shouldered, athletic natives were picked up
and tied with a cord around their waist” to be led off to France. 73 The Gaullist forces
certainly used as much brutality as earlier French administrations, using “all means,
including the most brutal, to enroll Africans in the French army.” 74
Even in the face of overwhelming pressure through the French colonial system,
Africans retained a certain degree of agency through their ability to flee. 75 For example,
one community in Oubangui-Chari, left in limbo by the political upheavals of summer
1940, migrated back and forth across the Chari River between French AEF and the
Belgian Congo as the authorities on each bank alternatively recruited or eased
recruitment as their governments exited and entered the war amid the defeat of both
metropoles. 76 Richard Joseph certified that flight remained an option, albeit a desperate
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one, for Cameroonians seeking to escape the privations of colonial rule. 77 The famed
sociologist Georges Balandier noted Africans’ frequent recourse to “escape to some part
of the country that was less strictly controlled” in the face of heavy government demands,
showing Africans’ ability to enter zones freer of European control than others. 78 Catholic
missionaries also noted this propensity, which accelerated markedly after the declaration
of war in 1939.79
Africans’ ability to flee the arm of the state limited the success of French coercive
recruitment. As Jacques Valette notes, all their brutality only put 16,000 men at the
disposition of the Free French authorities in AEF, a small number next to the 139,000
mobilized for service in Europe from across sub-Saharan Africa in 1939. 80 The French
ability to coerce African military service became weaker still in the desert versus the
riverine regions of Chad. On the one hand, the nomadic Islamic groups of the north
“superbly ignored Free France” whereas most of the Free French recruiting came from
the Saras, who had been particularly victimized and targeted in French racialist
conceptualization, depicting them as passive but warlike, particularly big children in the
French racializing mindset.81
Despite the coercive nature of the system, there are reasons Africans might join
the colonial army of their own accord. As Lormier pointed, the army “could represent a
chance to find a certain dignity” bringing value outside of a second-class status as an
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object of colonization with “wages, medals, [and] the prestige of a uniform.” 82 Pensions
after 15 years of service for career soldiers, 83 the promise of social mobility through
acquiring French language skills, basic job skills, and the wages, which accumulated over
a career might provide the bedrock for urban financial independence after the completion
of service.84 Phyllis Martin, extensively studying Brazzaville society during the colonial
era, has noted that “not least among the reasons for looking for employment with whites
was that clothing often came with the job,” such as the red fez of the tirailleurs, which
“still commanded respect when it was worn by veterans or by the local police.”85 Marc de
Possesse, observing recruitment in Cameroon late in the war, corroborates Martin’s
claim, noting their joyous reactions to receiving mere rags since “it was the first time any
of these men had owned anything,” ignoring the possibility of alternative conceptions of
ownership that might have been prevalent, but nonetheless confirming a desire for
acquisition among those he observed.86 Acquiring these goods is noted as a draw by
another author, who also notes the fact that Africans serving in the army escaped forced
labor.87
Studying recruitment in late 1939 in French West Africa, Isabelle Bournier and
Marc Pottier cite the unexpected application of 100,000 over the goal of 50,000, as
recruits were inspired by “a spirit of adventure,” a desire to see other countries, “the
desire to escape from misery with the future wages, [and] the sense that military
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hierarchy was less unequal than colonial order.”88 Such an optimistic view also cites the
amorphous ‘loyalism,’ but even if not all these cases were voluntary, these emotions
could be assumed to motivate young men to volunteer for war in Africa as elsewhere.
Jean-Bedel Bokassa, future president (and erstwhile emperor) of the Central African
Republic, was motivated by a desire to see the world, following his grandfather’s advice
that observed that “the men who joined the French army learned as much as if he had
lived three lives” and his own admiration of “soldiers, uniforms, and the exploits of great
generals.”89
Some Africans also pursued French military service in pursuit of ulterior
liberation, since veterans could “obtain the full French citizenship, under certain
conditions,” although the actual consummation of this ambition was rare.90 Indeed,
Henri-Richard Manga Mado depicts his enlistment in the French military as “liberty.” 91
Such political motivations for voluntarism appeared most often in Cameroon. Paul Soppo
Priso, the force behind the pro-French Jeucafra movement in Cameroon (discussed
below), may have pursued his agenda of African recruitment in Cameroon in order to
pursue this equalizing agenda. For example, Pierre Messmer remembered arriving in
Douala in October 1940, seeing black men carrying signs insisiting they enlist as “French
soldiers: Yes,” not as “[African] Riflemen: No.”92
Thus, Europeans in Cameroon were loath to recruit Cameroonian natives directly
until the desperation after the Armistice, hoping to prevent Cameroonian acquisition of
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French rights.93 This limitation placed on Africans’ rights even to sacrifice their lives in
military service attest to the retention of racist French views, despite their official
assimilationist ideology, such that one Senegalese recruit complained that “we were
never considered wholly French,” an obvious disappointment when high aspirations were
tied to an idealized egalitarian military. 94 Some Africans genuinely volunteered. For
example, in Cameroon, Richard Joseph noted that “although they were not required to
undertake military service under the terms of the Mandate, many still volunteered and
participated in the campaign led by Leclerc against the Italians in Libya.” 95 The African
interpreter Jacques Kuoh Moukouri remembered real voluntary service among his
compatriots, who “engaged as volunteers,” in such numbers that Leclerc had to urge
patience among the volunteers.96 The voluntarism of the few should not discount the
coercion of the many, or vice versa.
Even if Africans merely followed the orders of their officers, their presence in the
colonial army reflected a degree of agency, although that agency was limited by the
coercive system of recruitment practiced in French colonies.
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CHAPTER THREE

AFRICAN AUDIENCES IN THE RALLIES

The African residents of the French colonies in AEF made up a passive audience
of the political events of 1940. Without political power, and unless they were in the
military, without the power of force, these Africans were not consulted in the battles over
the territories’ foreign policies. Africans demonstrated agency in their responses to
Gaullist actions, both by affirming those actions and responding with indifference.
Indifference reflects agency, even if unconscious, rejecting a Eurocentric view for one
more concerned with Africans’ own interests. Africans used the same kind of attentisme
that metropolitan Frenchmen did, awaiting whether the Germans would prove victorious
or not before deciding whether to cooperate with the Vichy government. One European
colonist in Moyen-Congo described Africans’ attitudes in those terms, noting that during
the crisis of May 1940, “the natives, more detached, waited for ‘what would come,’ as
they had always done in the brush, amid the too-often repeated changes of
administrators.”97 Also, anti-Axis sentiment may have motivated the affirmations offered
by Africans to the Gaullist victories, differentiating that sentiment from a necessarily proFrench sentiment.
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African Awareness
Historians should avoid the fallacious conclusion that Africans remained ignorant
of how events in their native colonies and the colonial metropole affected one another. 98
Particularly in the urban, capital cities, Africans made note of events going on in far off
Europe. One Brazzaville woman claimed that “we had always followed the development
of events in France passionately.” 99 Jonathan Derrick, a historian of Douala, claims that
“in Douala, at least, Africans were well aware of events in Europe.”100 Particularly after
the outbreak of war in 1939, and then into the fall of France in 1940, Cameroonians’
awareness of the international situation was “more abundant and more various” than ever
before.101 Indeed, news of the French defeat in June 1940 led many Cameroonians to say
that the Germans would return, and Africans who had cooperated with the Germans
during their rule began to teach German to would-be future collaborators.102 In rural
areas, African awareness faded, as Lanne notes that only a small number of Chadians in
1940 “had information on the outside world.” 103 Even in Chad, though, the African
population became “privy to events thanks to eavesdropping servants and cooks.”104
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African workers in European homes often disseminated information from the press,
reading discarded magazines and newspapers and overhearing conversations,
demonstrating the diffusion of information in colonial circles thanks to the close
proximity of African ears with European mouths. 105
Africans also paid attention to European internecine politics in the colonial
capitals. Thus, in the days before the coup d’état in Brazzaville, colonist Jean de
Puytorac’s African friends “asked [him] to warn them. Warn them of what? I wondered.
Their responses proved to me that they were aware of what was coming.”106 In
Brazzaville, the Africans perhaps paid better attention than some Europeans, as in the
case of Blanche Ackermann-Athanassiades, who sent an African servant to warn a
hapless customs manager not to take his normal route home since the coup plotters
blocked it to isolate the governor-general. 107 In Cameroon, Jacques Kuoh Moukouri
remembered how the villagers knew of a development in the Gaullist-Vichy conflict
before he himself did, as a bureaucrat within the colonial power structure. 108

Indifference and Self-preservation
Africans often proved indifferent to the outcome of the Franco-French struggle.
Their attentisme corresponds to other populations under occupation, simply waiting to
join the winning side in order to maximize survival. Thus, Pierre Messmer noted that “the
Africans were passive” since they viewed the conflict among Frenchmen simply as
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“‘white business’ in which it was wise not to get oneself mixed up.”109 A French observer
remembered how Cameroonian soldiers shrugged off the Vichy-Gaullist conflict,
attributing it to “the ways of whites,” unknowable and irrelevant to their opinions. 110
Messmer recounts an Africanization of the war as “a war among white tribes which
[Africans] have been dragged into.”111
African indifference proved a boon to the Gaullists who raided the Cameroonian
port of Douala over the night of August 26-27, although it represented worldviews firmly
out of line with the European Gaullists’ fixation on a French conflict. As Émile Tutenges
notes in his memories of the Douala raid, when the canoes landed at the docks of Douala,
the Frenchmen “saw a small group of native customs officers, pistols at their belts,” but
when Tutenges approached their chief, he was obeyed immediately, allowing the
Frenchmen to enter the city in a highly unconventional manner, and eventually seize
control of the territory. Tutenges attributes his success to the fact that he wore a French
uniform, unquestionably obeyed by the African ‘subject,’ although the possibility
remains that these customs officers were able to surmise the illegality of these
Europeans’ actions, like the canoe rowers had done, but chose to comply nonetheless.
Earlier in Tiko, a similarly unquestioning (British) Cameroonian guard had permitted
these Europeans to retake their confiscated arms for the raid, which Tutenges also
evaluates as a racialist deference, since “the prestige of the European, at that time, was
very much real.”112 Fratacci, one of the raiders, overcame the dozen Africans guarding
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the Post Office, finding them sleeping, but their sergeant recognized Fratacci, who
promptly said “It’s you, sergeant! We’re very glad!” before going back to sleep, deferring
to the known European.113 The African’s poor performance may indicate a subtle form of
colonial resistance, or at least indifference and finding space within the imperial system
for personal freedom.
Securing Yaoundé after seizing control of Douala depended more on the
obedience and compliance of African soldiers, notably those under the command of
Leclerc’s collaborator Major Dio. These African troops, under orders from their
European officers complying with Gaullist objectives, actually executed the orders to
secure Yaoundé.114 This operation comprised an interesting incident, as the African
soldiers under Gaullist command occupied the Yaoundé police station, which had been
vacated by the pro-Vichy police chief while he searched for the Gaullist culprit who cut
the telephone lines from Yaoundé to Douala overnight to permit the Gaullist occupation.
Returning to find his office occupied by African soldiers, the police chief immediately
declared himself a Gaullist – though the fact that the soldiers were African may not have
been important.115 Nonetheless, the incident represents a reversal in the traditional
colonial power relationship, as African soldiers exerted power over a European colonist,
ironically one charged with guaranteeing law-and-order.
African indifference also aided the Gaullists in September when a small core of
Gaullist Europeans and Africans executed a ruse to force the surrender of the port,
enabled by deference shown to the Europeans by African soldiers. Walking into a full
company of African soldiers gathered in the city center of Mayumba to defend it from
113
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Gaullist attack, the African soldiers, although faltering initially on not recognizing these
Europeans in particular, saluted them and allowed them to pass. The African soldiers
saluted the Gaullists, seeing only French officers, not Gaullists. 116 The passivity and
deference of African soldiers to their European officers evidenced in this incident, as in
the incidents in the Douala raid, seem to suggest an African indifference to which
Frenchmen were in command. As Ollandet commented, “the issue simply involved a
change in master,”117 and another African agreed, remembering how he and his
compatriots “recognized that ‘the white is the same,’ whether he be English, French, or
German.”118
Such indifference proved wise in retrospect for Africans living with the Gaullist
administrations, which did not differ radically from pro-Vichy administrations. For
example, one consequence of the Free French establishing Douala as their post-rally
capitol for Cameroon was the requisitioning of urban Africans’ homes and bodies. Ateba
Yene tells of his father, Hermann Yene, hosting Pierre Messmer (later prime minister of
France under Georges Pompidou from 1972-1974) and two other Gaullist officers in their
home, leaving the Yene household in a hastily-constructed hut. The symbolism of a
European forcing a Westernized, “evolved” African out of his urban, ‘modern’ home into
a hut, thus reversing France’s professed ‘mission civilisatrice’ in the interest of European
comfort, is deeply ironic. Beyond reclaiming the home, the European soldiers also
claimed the bodies of Douala’s women. Cameroonian historian Théodore Ateba Yene
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recounts the spectacle of “the forced gathering of all the young, chesty, virgin women in
order to throw them into the [military camp]” for the pleasure of the legionnaires. The
Gaullists, at least for Douala, merely represented another episode of European
exploitation of Africans’ territory, here in the most domestic spheres. 119
The African audience to the Gaullist rallies of 1940 also acted for selfpreservation. Thus, Félix Éboué seemed to identify sentiments among the African
population turning against the armistice accepted by the Vichy government, if only for
economic self-interest. In a telegram to Pierre Boisson on July 29, Éboué complained that
the “native population” was “troubled by high prices” and by the rumor beginning to
spread that France “was undertaking war against England.” 120 Writing to de Gaulle two
days before, on July 27, Éboué worried that “the indecisive attitude of the leaders created
disarray which has now reached even some aware elements of the native population.”121
From these hints, we can see that the European-educated Éboué took note of native unrest
in light of the instability of colonial life after the defeat of the metropole. Looking at
these comments from a different angle, we see Africans disturbed not for the sanctity of
the French empire but concerned about the effects of political instability on their personal
economies and wellbeing. A later French historian, examining French censors’ notes on
African correspondence during this time period, noted little concern with the political
situation, and more concern with personal and financial questions. 122 Likewise, Africans
demonstrated agency around the attack on Libreville, as natives fled en masse from
119
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Libreville in late October, hoping to avoid the conflict and accept the new rule of the Free
French forces.123

Affirmations of the Gaullist Victory
Africans also demonstrated agency in choosing to affirm, through public
celebrations, the Gaullist victories in AEF. Though retrospective on the rallies as a series
of fait accompli, Africans nonetheless demonstrated agency whether they sought to
please the new administrations or expressed genuine approval. The Gaullist regime saw
these demonstrations as critical, given its tenuous legal and geographical claim to
represent the French state. Moreover, if the public had opposed the military actions with
protests or non-compliance, the audacious rallies would have failed. The Gaullists needed
the African audiences to accept the rallies, and Africans did. Although they excluded
Africans from any role in determining the orientation of their homelands, the Gaullists
expected African leaders to “declare their loyalty to whoever won,” and “they did so.”124
Cameroon, having been colonized by Germany before the Great War in 19141918, seems to have followed the ongoing crisis in Europe more closely than other parts
of AEF. The Vichy envoy Platon, visiting Cameroon in late July, would have little
incentive to overplay an African Gaullism, making his report to Boisson all the more
interesting. He claims that around “80% [of the European population] is resolutely on the
side of the English,” which Governor-General Brunot claimed echoed the “same
sentiments [which] animate the native population.” Brunot may have had reason to
exaggerate an African discontent with this decision in order to bolster his excuse for
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bowing to ‘public pressure’ in aligning Cameroon thus far with the British Cameroons
and British Nigeria. 125 Pro-Vichy Raymond Waag visited Gaullist Yaoundé on
September 11, 1940, and in his missive of early 1941 to Pétain, he notes with disgust how
“here, everyone is ‘GAULLIST’ and shows it,” even the “Cameroonians, [who] wear
coats of arms with the Cross of Lorraine” [the emblem of Free France]. 126 When the
newly formed Free French forces from Britain landed in Douala after failing to land in
Dakar in late September, one of the French officers remembered later how even “the
schoolchildren (some miniscule, which made them seem even more black!)” lined the
streets, “waving their little flags.” 127 Africans demonstrated agency, participating in
affirming the Gaullist victories whether because they thought it was expected or because
they genuinely affirmed the victories.
In Moyen-Congo, anecdotal evidence indicates the presence of at least some
genuine political feeling in favor of Gaullism. A. Sicé recounts being approached by
several Africans in Brazzaville on June 23, 1940. The older Africans, old coworkers of
Sicé’s at the Pasteur Institute in Congo, Health Service employees, and the Senegalese
chief Amadou Diop, asked Sicé to explain why France had signed an armistice with
Germany. They recounted that the armistice “had not only surprised but devastated the
native population,” who thus “supplicated that [the French] whom they know well not
abandon” them. 128 In Poto-Poto near Brazzaville, Diop showed Sicé a placard
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proclaiming “We want to stay French,” which Sicé cites as “irrefutable proof of the
loyalism of these blacks of Africa who stayed so deeply attached to France.” 129
The city of Brazzaville greeted Charles de Gaulle with genuine enthusiasm, as
recounted by several Free French eyewitnesses, although their propensity to exaggerate
the popular nature of these events must be taken into consideration. Sicé claims that the
“European town and the African villages were taken out en masse” to the airstrip to greet
de Gaulle on October 24, and that among the many “natives waving the flag” was Diop,
surrounded by subordinates waving the “We want to stay French” placard. Sicé perhaps
betrays exaggeration when he goes on to justify this occurrence, explaining that “the
enthusiasm of the natives was assuredly spontaneous.”130 Another French resident of
Brazzaville, Blanche Ackermann-Athanassiaous, confirms Sicé’s depiction of the
reception, also writing that Brazzaville “in full” came to the airstrip to welcome de
Gaulle, including “the enormous crowd from the two villages of Bacongo and PotoPoto,” the native districts of Brazzaville. 131 Jean de Puytorac also certified the presence
of a “crowd of natives, who came by the thousands,” at the arrival of de Gaulle. 132

Genuine Anti-Axis Sentiment among Africans?
Some accounts claim that Africans fought for the French, not out of pro-French
sentiment, but in opposition to Germans and the Nazi ideology. Indeed, some less
prominent narratives of events in AEF claim that Africans were motivated to fight,
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particularly in Gabon, by being told that they were fighting Germans there, even when
those arguments were patently untrue. The pro-Vichy Aumasson, president of the
Gabonese Chamber of Commerce, claimed while in Dakar as an exile of the Gaullist
military victory in Gabon that the six hundred “Saras” fighting in Gabon had been told
that “Libreville was defended by the Germans.”133 Another contemporary, with less
interest in contradicting the Gaullist account, corroborates this claim, saying that “the
opening of hostilities [in Gabon] rested…on a lie as shameless in its development as
mysterious in its origins,” that the forces were going “to fight in Gabon important forces
of the Axis, Germans and Italians.” 134 The assumption of higher Sara motivation to fight
Germans rather than wicked Frenchmen shows actual anti-Axis sentiment among the
Africans.
Particularly in Cameroon, anti-German sentiment was indeed expressed before
and during the war, which might be expected to continue into the period of the Armistice.
The Cameroonian Union, “composed of ‘European and native chiefs’” formed in 1938 to
“defend the interests of Cameroon,” sending identical letters to British Prime Minister
Chamberlain, U.S. President Roosevelt, and French premier Daladier “protesting against
any possible return of territory to Germany.” 135 Their letter contains a decidedly antiGerman strain, claiming that “we have known German domination and we have no wish
to return to a country which persecutes our race [presumably, black Africans].” 136 More
importantly, the French Cameroonian Youth (Jeucafra), formed in 1938 with French
133
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funding in order to counter a pro-independence movement, had as a secondary goal to
stand in opposition to Germany’s return to Cameroon, albeit with the pro-French goal of
integration into the French Empire as a colony rather than an officially League of
Nations-mandated territory.137
Anti-German sentiment had merit in French Cameroon, given memories of
“abusive acquisitions, particularly through falsified contracts” and forced labor,
volunteers being short since “the reputation of the plantations was not good.”138 The
historical memory of a previous colonization would be a legitimate source for decisionmaking, since even people only 30-40 years old would have lived through the contentious
years of Franco-German debate over the return of Germany’s ‘lost colony,’ and “the
conquered [Cameroonians], just like the conquerors [the French], integrated a variable
international dimension into their history.” 139 Richard Joseph, studying political
conditions in Cameroon in the 1970s, confirms that “much hardship was suffered by
Camerounians under German rule” and that even sixty years later, “in nearly every region
of Cameroun…a particular German administrator is remembered for the barbaric depths
to which he descended in bringing civilization to the ‘primitives.’” 140 At least one Duala
chief, Paraiso, opposed Germany out of vengeance against German appropriation of his
family’s property during their rule. 141
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Africans feared German colonization outside of Cameroon, also. Although
Gaullists obviously carefully selected certain anecdotes, the anecdotal evidence
constitutes evidence nonetheless, even if not representative of the full picture. Sicé claims
that the signature of the Armistice with Germany created “unquestionable anxiety” since
“they remembered the arrival of the Germans” in 1911-1914, colonizing the so-called
‘Bec de Canard’ as compensation for Morocco after the Second Morocco Crisis in 1911.
Fearing German re-colonization, Sicé claims that the African leaders in the villages
around Brazzaville came to him “beseeching that we, French that they knew well, not
abandon Equatorial Africa and its inhabitants to the Germans.” 142 Another Gaullist
account, explicitly propagandistic (serving as material for the Free French lobby in the
United States during the war), cites another anecdote from a chief in Logone on the
Cameroon-Chad border, saying “I know the Germans” and that “they killed my father’s
people.”143 Both of these examples, it should be noted, concern direct colonial contact
with the Germans in and around Cameroon, making German rule a more concrete reality
rather than a mere conceptualization. However, Africans had no illusions about French
rule, either, despite its brutality being glossed over by Gaullist sources, making a FrancoGerman choice an ambiguous one at best.
One account from an African author captures the ambiguity of the choices for
Africans in Cameroon. A Fang community on the Gabon-Cameroon border remembered
the German rule in Cameroon as “more brutal and inhuman than the French system,”
especially resenting the Germans’ award of “quasi-absolute” power, allegedly alien to the
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Fang leadership structure, to an already artificial ethnic-based leadership created by the
colonial power to serve as an intermediary with the Africans. As implied in the statement
that German rule was only “more brutal and inhuman” than French rule, the French
period was no utopian colonial paradise. Rather, the French retained the same Germanappointed chiefs, but reduced their “exaggerated” powers. For this community, the
French represented the lesser of two evils. 144 In light of Nazi racial ideology denouncing
Africans as “sub-humans,” French imperialism would certainly seem the lesser of two
evils.145
In the aftermath of the Gaullist rally in Cameroon, though, this narrative does
seem to be supported by African actions. The Gaullist lobby in the United States quoted
an anonymous Logone chief at the Cameroon-Congo border to support the claim of
African opposition to Germany, citing him saying that “I know the Germans” and “they
killed my father’s people,” whereas “the French made us free.”146 Similar arguments are
expressed by Muracciole, who points out parenthetically, but suggestively, that the
Africans “still remembered the German occupation,” and by Adolphe Sicé, who claims
rather idealistically that France replaced German rule, characterized by “methods of force
and oppression, punctuated by acts of barbarism and inhumanity, which had always
characterized the Germanic spirit and tendency.” 147 Raymond Dronne, explaining why
African soldiers under his command continued to fight through claimed that they
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“retained a dismal memory of German domination,” key to their decision to follow him
as he opted for Gaullism. 148
Anti-Nazi and anti-German sentiment in Cameroon would appear to be paralleled
by anti-Italian sentiment in Chad, bordering Italian Libya. A colonial report from
February 1940 notes that, despite mobilization and its conscription of troops, there had
been “no exoduses [across the border],” but rather movement “returning into Chad” since
“native life is more easy in French Territory [Chad] than in Libya where grain and meat
are rare and expensive.”149 Refugees from Libya were particularly eager to fight, as the
initial enthusiasm for the war “still persists” in early 1940, the French needing to hold
back the local bey, who led his community to “accept reluctantly, the idea that they
would not return, arms in hand, to Italian territory.” 150 This report cites certain Toubbou
from Libya requesting permission to settle in French territory in order to avoid Italian war
conscription and deprivation, deemed greater than in French Chad, and perhaps hoping
also to avoid a war between France and Italy, which natives believed was imminent. 151
The French administration claimed to draw strong support from the Islamic leadership of
northern Chad, noting that localized “religious leaders…are absolutely devoted to us,”
perhaps in response to or creating the greater attention “given to the events [of war in
Europe].”152
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149
Territory of Tchad to Gouvernement Général de l’A.E.F., “Rapport Politique” (February 22, 1940), 6.
ANOM AEF/GGAEF/4D/4/50.
150
Ibid., 3. Found in ANOM AEF/GGAEF/4D/4/50.
151
Ibid., 7. Found in ANOM AEF/GGAEF/4D/4/50.
152
Ibid., 5 and 7. ANOM AEF/GGAEF/4D/4/50. Deroo and Champeaux, 160, recount similar use of
Islamic clergy to propagate anti-Nazi views in Senegal.

42

As for the majority of people, though, the February 1940 snapshot of Chad gives
the sense of deep-seated apathy about the war, which retained “little attention” for the
“masses,”153 who accepted the war with “fatalism,” desiring that the war would confine
itself “among the whites,” with even a Franco-Italian armistice welcomed in order to end
the war.154 One upshot of this apathy was that contempt for Italians eclipsed the already
dim view of Germans in Chad, even if there was little positive attachment to the
French.155
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CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

Africans participated in the rally of AEF to General de Gaulle, even if they did
not plan the operations. Africans also constituted the audiences of the rallies, serving as
important legitimizers for the Gaullist project to reconstruct a French polity outside the
metropole. In both these roles, Africans exhibited agency, making conscious choices to
control their own actions and affect the situations around them.
African soldiers obeyed their Gaullist officers, toppling governments in Gabon
and Moyen-Congo (Brazzaville). African soldiers involved in the Gabon campaign also
exploited the confusion of the situation to set their own agendas. African soldiers also
obeyed Gaullist invaders, enabling the capture of Douala and several towns during the
Gabon campaign. The indifference of Africans to their European commanders, and of
African publics to which regime governed them, gives us insight into the limitations of
colonialism. Even in a total war where Europeans could mobilize the martial bodies of
Africans as soldiers, they could not capture their minds and prompt Africans to invest
themselves morally or nationalistically in the defense of France. The ability of Africans
to evade the French state through migration also attests to limits to the French empire’s
capacity to control the lives of its subjects.
This study does not attempt to minimize the intrusiveness of the colonial
experience, which exercised itself in forced conscription, appropriation of female bodies
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for European soldiers, and far greater pains through forced labor projects in the years
after AEF’s rally. Rather, this study attempts to highlight the spaces within which
Africans retained and exercised agency, such as through migration or in the vacuums
produced in chaotic military situations such as those in Gabon. Likewise, this study
attempts to focus on African voices to see rationales behind why Africans would act
certain ways, such as reasons behind Africans joining the French colonial military, or
reasons why Africans might opt to support the lesser evil of French continuation rather
than risk the threat of German takeover. This study found limits in its European texts and
archival research, but the presence of such clear African agency in even a Eurocentric
research process reveals the necessity for further research, especially in Central Africa
itself. Africans have often been voiceless in African history, less because they did not
speak and more because no one listened. Thus, studies by African and other historians in
Africa, particularly probing into oral histories, could reveal new perspectives on the
events of 1940 and nuance our understandings of Africans’ involvement in the Second
World War. I hope that this study will be the first step in such a process.
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